This paper presents a general equilibrium model that is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that the U.S. price level and in ‡ation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. The model of this paper builds on recent work by Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), who show that models of endogenous attention allocation deliver prices to be more responsive to more volatile shocks as, everything else being equal, …rms pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks. In fact, according to the U.S. data, aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy shocks inducing in this paper, …rms to pay more attention to the former than to the latter. However, most important, this work adds to the literature by showing that the ability of the model of this paper to account for observed price dynamics crucially depends on monetary policy. In particular, this paper shows how interest rate feedback rules affect the incentives faced by …rms in allocating attention. A policy rate responding more actively to expected in ‡ation and output ‡uctuations induces …rms to pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks. This new mechanism of transmission of monetary policy helps rationalizing the observed behavior of prices in response to technology and monetary policy shocks, and implies novel predictions about the impact of changes in Taylor rules coe¢ cients on economic ‡uctuations.
Introduction
Recent empirical work on nominal price adjustment has shown that the U.S. aggregate price level and in ‡ation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks, such as innovation in total factor productivity, than to monetary policy shocks, such as unexpected innovations in the Federal Funds rate. 1 Standard models of sticky prices have a hard time explaining the di¤erent behavior of the price level and in ‡ation in response to these two aggregate shocks. 2 Indeed, one of the central issues in modern macroeconomics is understanding how …rms set their prices in response to di¤erent aggregate shocks. This is an important task for monetary policy analysis and implementation. Understanding the transmission of technology and monetary policy shocks is particularly relevant as these shocks account together for a large fraction of business cycle ‡uctuations. 3 I present a model that is consistent with the empirical evidence that prices respond much more quickly to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. I show that this response pattern arises naturally in a framework based on imperfect information with an endogenous choice of information structure similar to
Sims [24] . In this model, …rms will optimally choose to allocate more attention to those particular shocks that, in expectations, most reduce pro…ts when prices are not adjusted properly. The more attention …rms pay to a type of shock, the faster they respond to it. This is a result that has been emphasized in the seminal paper by Mackowiak and
Wiederholt [18] , where these authors have shown that …rms pay more attention to sector speci…c shocks than to aggregate nominal shocks roughly because the former are much more volatile than the latter. So, at …rst sight, this result would directly translate to a framework with aggregate technology and monetary policy shocks:
1 See Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde [2] and Paciello [21] . Figure 1 at the end of the paper plots in ‡ation and price level responses estimated by Paciello [21] . 2 See Dupor, Han and Tsai [10] . 3 See, for intance, Smets and Wouters (2007) .
since in the U.S. aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy shocks, everything else being equal, …rms allocate more attention to the former than to latter, inducing faster price responses to technology shocks. 4 However, most important, I show that this not the whole story. In a standard general equilibrium model, for given shock volatilities, there are two important channels that may amplify or reduce di¤erences in attention allocation across di¤erent types of shocks. These channels relate to monetary policy and real rigidities. Both channels in ‡uence the attention allocation decision by changing the incentives faced by …rms in allocating attention. In particular, the monetary policy channel has not been studied in the literature.
I show that, when monetary policy follows a simple interest rate feedback rule, such as a Taylor rule, a policy responding more to expected in ‡ation and output ‡uctuations increases complementarity in attention allocation. This higher complementarity induce …rms to pay more attention to the same variables that other …rms pay more attention to, amplifying the di¤erence in price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks. Under the benchmark calibration of the model, monetary policy activism substantially contributes to magnifying the impact of di¤erent shock volatilities onto attention allocation decision. This ampli…cation helps to rationalize the observed di¤erence in price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks.
Moreover, these results unveil a novel mechanism of transmission of monetary policy to the economy: monetary policy a¤ects price responsiveness through its feedback on the attention allocation decision. This mechanism introduces an asymmetry in the way changes in coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule in ‡uence price responsiveness to di¤erent shocks. When, for instance, coe¢ cients on expected in ‡ation and output ‡uctuations increase, the new equilibrium is characterized by a larger fraction of 4 Figure 2 at the end of the paper plots the growth rate in total factor productivity and the change in the FedFunds rate from 1960 to 2007. Other authors have estimated the volatility of technology and monetary policy shocks within DSGE models. See, for instance, Smets and Wouters [25] . attention paid to the most volatile shocks, and a smaller fraction paid to the least volatile ones. As a consequence the change in policy, everything else being equal, this channel of transmission causes price variability to reduce relatively less conditional on the most volatile shocks, and more conditional on the least volatile ones.
In addition, this paper adds to the literature by deriving a closed form solution to the static linear-quadratic version of the general equilibrium model. This solution yields valuable economic insights on the feedback from the di¤erent structural parameters of the model to the attention allocation decision, and allows to fully capture the interaction between monetary policy, real rigidities and complementarity in attention allocation.
The results of this paper are obtained within a standard general equilibrium framework with a representative household, monopolistically competitive …rms and a central bank that sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type policy rule.
In this model, prices respond more to the realizations of shocks about which …rms are better informed. Technology shocks are aggregate innovations to labor productivity, while monetary policy shocks are temporary deviations of the nominal interest rate from the monetary policy rule. The only friction introduced in this framework is that …rms might not be well informed about the realizations of the shocks when changing their prices. The information structure of the economy is modeled along the lines of Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] . There is a limit on the total attention a …rm can pay to the di¤erent shocks. This limit introduces a trade-o¤ in the allocation of attention.
This paper relates to the large literature studying price setting decisions under incomplete information. Incomplete information theories have been popular in accounting for the sluggish price adjustment in response to monetary policy shocks.
Behind these theories there is the assumption that …rms only pay attention to a relatively small number of economic indicators. With imprecise information about aggregate conditions, prices respond with delay to changes in nominal spending. This simple idea was …rst proposed by Phelps [22] and formalized by Lucas [16] . More recently Woodford [26] , Mankiw and Reis [17] , and Sims [24] , have renewed attention to imperfect information and limited information processing as sources of inertial prices. In particular, Woodford has used an incomplete information model to explain the sluggish response of prices to aggregate nominal shocks. According to Woodford [26] , such a framework could deliver prices responding more to aggregate supply shocks than to nominal demand shocks, if …rms were relatively more informed about the former than they were about the latter. However, he leaves open the question of why …rms should choose to be relatively more informed about some types of shocks.
Sims [24] and Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] study the endogenous optimal choice of the information structure. In particular, Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] focus on the di¤erential response of prices to aggregate nominal shocks versus idiosyncratic shocks in a framework with limited information-processing capabilities, and with an exogenous process for nominal spending. In parallel and independent work Mackowiak and Wiederholt [19] have extended their previous analysis to study business cycle dynamics under rational inattention in a DSGE model. Similarly to this paper, these authors …nd that this class of models generates prices and in ‡ation to be more responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. However, the two papers are complements on other important dimensions. In particular, while Mackowiak and Wiederholt [19] focus more on the interaction between attention allocation decision by …rms and real rigidities originating from imperfectly informed households, this paper studies more in detail the role of monetary policy. Monetary policy proves crucial for in ‡ation and price level responsiveness, a¤ecting directly the attention allocation decision. Moreover, this paper provides a closed form solution to the general equilibrium of the static model. This paper also relates to the work by Branch, Carlson, Evans and McGough [7] .
These authors have studied a model of endogenous inattention, where monetary policy activism in ‡uences the overall information acquisition rate of …rms. This paper contributes to this literature in studying the way monetary policy in ‡uences economic dynamics through a new margin related to the allocation of given information processing capability across di¤erent types of information.
Finally, within the imperfect information literature, Hellwig and Veldkamp [13] have recently emphasized the interaction of strategic complementarity in price setting with endogenous information acquisition by …rms. Relative to these authors, this paper further shows how the interaction of strategic complementarity in price setting and endogenous information acquisition depends on monetary policy activism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 describes a static solution of the model. Section 4 discusses a dynamic extension of the model. Section 5 assesses robustness of results. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Apart from the information structure, this paper studies a standard general equilibrium model of incomplete nominal adjustment with monopolistic …rms along the lines of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [6] . The information structure of …rms is modeled along the lines of Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] : Time is discrete and in…nite. There is a measure 1 of di¤erent intermediate goods, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]; each produced by a monopolistic …rm using labor as the only input into production. Intermediate goods are aggregated into a …nal good by a perfectly competitive …nal good sector through a Dixit-Stiglitz technology with constant returns to scale. On the consumption side, there is an in…nitely-lived representative household with preferences de…ned over consumption and labor supply in each period. Financial markets are complete and …nancial assets are in zero initial supply. For simplicity it is assumed that the representative household takes its decisions under perfect information. The monetary authority controls the risk free nominal interest rate according to a given monetary policy rule. There are two sources of uncertainty in the economy: the …rst is related to realizations of aggregate technology shocks to labor productivity and the second is associated to unexpected deviations of the nominal interest rate from the monetary policy rule.
Household Preferences: The representative household's preferences over sequences of the …nal good consumption and labor supply fC t+ ; L t+ g 1 =0 are given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and E t ( ) denotes the household's expectations conditional on the realizations of all variables up to period t. The household has complete information. The household's objective is to maximize (1) subject to its sequence of ‡ow budget constraints, for = 0; 1; :::
where S t+ denotes the nominal value of the state-contingent asset in period t + , Q t+ ;t+ +1 represents the period t + price of one unit of currency to be delivered in a particular state of period t + + 1, P t+ is the price of the …nal consumption good, W t+ the nominal wage rate, and D t+ the aggregate pro…ts of the corporate sector rebated to the household. The household is subject to a borrowing constraint that prevents engaging in Ponzi schemes,
with certainty, and in each state of the world that may be reached in period t + + 1;
where
The assumption of complete …nancial markets ensures the existence of a risk-free portfolio in period t paying a nominal interest rate R t in period t + 1:
Monetary Policy: It is assumed that the monetary authority controls the nom-inal interest rate according to a Taylor-type policy rule,
where and c are parameters, t+1 P t+1 Pt is in ‡ation, and C t is the level of potential consumption, de…ned as the level of consumption that would hold in the frictionless economy with perfect information; " r;t is an iid and normally distributed monetary policy disturbance, " r;t v N (0; is appealing both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Approximate (and in some cases exact) forms of this rule are optimal for a central bank that has a quadratic loss function in deviations of in ‡ation and output from their respective targets in a generic macro model with price inertia. 5 On the empirical side, a number of authors have emphasized that policy rules like (4) provide reasonable good descriptions of the way major central banks behave, at least in recent years. 6 Later in the paper, I will extend the analysis to allow for inertia in nominal interest rates.
Final Good Producers:
The …nal consumption good is produced by a large number of perfectly informed producers through a constant return to scale technology given by
where > 1 is the demand elasticity parameter. The demand for intermediate good i follows from pro…ts maximization by …nal good producers and it is given by
It follows from (5) (6) that the …nal good price P t is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz 5 See, e.g., Woodford [27] . 6 See, e.g., Orphanides [20] .
aggregator
Intermediate Good Producers: Each intermediate good is produced by a single monopolistic …rm using labor as the only input into production, according to a technology with decreasing returns to scale given by
where " a;t is an iid and normally distributed technology innovation to aggregate labor productivity, " a;t v N (0; 2 a ) ; and 2 [0; 1] determines the returns to scale in production, corresponding for instance to the presence of a …rm-speci…c factor that is costly to adjust at short horizons. Firm i's nominal pro…ts are given by
By substituting (8) into (9), nominal pro…ts can be expressed as a function of …rm i's prices
Given (6) and (10) ; the …rst-order condition for pro…t-maximization under perfect information implies 7 log p i;t = log 1 1 + log (P t ) + (log (C t ) " a;t ) ;
where p i;t denotes the pro…t-maximizing price, and is the degree of real rigidity, 7 Notice that, in deriving (11), I have used the fact that given by This quadratic approximation is given by
1 > 0 is a constant and C is the level of consumption in the non-stochastic steady state. 9 Given (13) and the assumption 8 In the static equilibrium of this model this assumption is irrelevant as the attention allocation choice is time-consistent. 9 See appendix A1 for the derivation. In a similar framework Maćkoviak and Wiederholt [18] show that solving the attention allocation problem through the quadratic approximation of the objective delivers accurate results when the amount of information processed per period (i.e. as of independent information processing about the two types of shocks, the attention allocation problem of intermediate good producer i reads max fs ai;t ; s ri;t g
subject to the information ‡ow constraint I (f" a;t ; " r;t g ; fs ai;t ; s ri;t g) ;
and to the optimal price setting behavior conditional on the information available at each period;
where s t ai = fs ai;1 ; s ai;2 ; :::; s ai;t g and s t ri = fs ri;1 ; s ri;2 ; :::; s ri;t g represent the realization of the signal processes about technology and monetary policy shocks respectively up to period t. The parameter indexes …rm's total attention. In practice, if is …-nite, the information ‡ow constraint prevents decision makers from choosing p i;t = p i;t in each period and state of the world. The operator I measures measures the average amount of information contained in the signal processes fs ai;t ; s ri;t g about the realizations of the fundamental shocks of the economy, and viceversa. 10 For simplicity, this paper considers signals taking the form of fundamental shock plus noise,
s ri;t = " r;t + u ri;t ; u ri;t s N (0;
where u ai;t and u ri;t are iid errors with standard deviations ai and ri . 11 This signal de…nied later) is large enough so that the actual pricing behavior is not very di¤erent from the pro…t-maximizing one. 10 For a de…nition of the operator I see Appendix A2. 11 It is possible to show that, in the static equilibrium of this model, the optimal signal structure structure, together with constraint (15) ; implies a trade-o¤ in the attention allocation across the two types of shocks: if a …rm pays more attention to one type of shock (i.e. chooses the corresponding signal process to be relatively more informative), it necessarily has to pay less attention to the other type of shock. While the assumption that …rms process information independently about technology and monetary policy shocks is probably extreme, it has the important advantage of introducing an endogenous information choice into an otherwise standard general equilibrium framework while keeping the model tractable enough to allow for a closed form solution.
This solution provides valuable information on the interaction between the di¤erent components of the model. In Section 5 I will show that main results of the paper are robust to other signal structures where the independence assumption is removed. In particular, I show that results of the paper about the interaction of monetary policy activism and attention allocation still hold when …rms are allowed, to some extent, to process information jointly about the two types of shocks.
Equilibrium De…nition: De…nition 1 describes stationary equilibria in which all the endogenous variables of the economy can be expressed as functions of the realizations of the fundamental shocks f" a;t g and f" r;t g : In what follows the notation
De…nition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a set of functions; C t ( ) ; L t ( ) ; S t ( ) ; P t ( ) ; W t ( ) ; Q t;t+1 ( ) ; p i;t ( ) ; p i;t ( ) ; s ai;t ( ) and s ri;t ( ) such that:
(ii) P t ( ) satis…es (7) ;
(iii) ai and ri maximize (14) subject to (15) (16) and ( (vii) all other markets clear.
in (14) (16) is of the form (17) (18) : Appendix C contains more details.
The static equilibrium
The model is solved through a log-linearization of the …rst order conditions characterizing the equilibrium of the economy in a neighbor of the non-stochastic steady
state. In what followsX t log X t log X denotes the value of X t in log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Lemma 1 describes the non-stochastic steady state.
Lemma 1 For a given normalization of P ; there exists a unique non-stochastic steady
Proof: See appendix B.
Solving for the equilibrium of this economy requires solving for a …xed point. In fact, the attention allocation problem in (14) (16) depends on the stochastic process for the pro…t-maximizing price,p i;t ; which in turn depends on the stochastic process for the price level,P t : The latter is an average over all intermediate good prices and therefore depends itself on the solution to the attention allocation problem of …rms.
Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium dynamics ofP t andĈ t :
Proposition 1 There exists a static equilibrium in which the equilibrium dynamics of economic variables in log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state in period t are given by a set of linear functions of " a;t and " r;t : In this equilibrium, the price level and consumption are given bŷ
where a and r are coe¢ cients given by
while the coe¢ cients ; ; , , and the function ( ) are given by a r ;
= min 2 1 ; 2 + 2 (1 ) .
Proof: See Appendix C.
The equilibrium responses of prices to the two shocks depend on relative volatility,
; on the degree of real rigidity, ; on the average quantity of information processed per period, ; and on : The parameter has an important economic meaning, as it indexes relative monetary policy aggressiveness on expected in ‡ation and output-gap.
The smaller ; the more aggressive policy on expected in ‡ation or output-gap.
The function ( ) determines the equilibrium price level responsiveness to a given shock as a function of relative volatility of that shock. The function ( ) is increasing in its argument for values of 2 ( 1 ; ): Therefore, the equilibrium price level is more responsive to relatively more volatile shocks.
Moreover, the slope of ( ) with respect to its argument depends on and :
the smaller and ; the larger the impact of a change in relative volatility, ; on price level responsiveness to the two shocks. ), signi…cantly magnify di¤erences in price responsiveness.
Next sections discusses more in detail the way monetary policy and the other structural parameters a¤ect equilibrium price level responsiveness through the endogenous attention allocation decision.
Equilibrium attention allocation
The equilibrium price responsiveness in (21) (26) depends on the equilibrium attention allocation by …rms. In fact, the more informative signals (17) (18) are; the more responsive prices are to each shock. How informative is each type of signal is determined endogenously through the attention allocation decision. This section describes the properties of the equilibrium attention allocation.
Solving the attention allocation problem implies choosing the precision of signals (17) (18) so to maximize (14) subject to (15) (16) : The attention allocation problem depends on the equilibrium dynamics of the pro…t-maximizing price. These dynamics, in deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, are obtained by substituting (20)
where the equilibrium dynamics ofP t are given by (21) (26) . The coe¢ cient can be interpreted as the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting: the smaller ; the larger the feedback from the price level to pro…t-maximizing prices. Given that attention allocation decision depends on the dynamics ofp it ; and the price level,P t ;
depends on the average allocation of attention of …rms in the economy, the coe¢ cient also represents the degree of complementarity in attention allocation: the smaller ; the larger the feedback from average attention allocation to to pro…t-maximizing prices and, therefore, to …rm's allocation of attention decision.
According to the objective of the attention allocation problem, for given dynamics ofp it ; the …rms faces a smaller loss in pro…ts at lower values of the mean square error in price setting. Given the average amount of information processed per period, ; the mean square error in price setting is larger, the larger the volatility of the shocks and the larger the responsiveness ofp it to the shocks. Firms can reduce the mean square error due to a particular shock by allocating relative more attention to it. Therefore, …rms have incentives to allocate a larger fraction of to the type of shock that is either more volatile or induces a larger responsiveness of the pro…t-maximizing price.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the optimal attention allocation is such that signal precision to each type of shock is given by
where ! represents pro…t-maximizing price responsiveness to technology shocks relative to monetary policy shocks,
Proof: See Appendix C. 
It follows from (28) and (30) that shock volatilities a¤ect the attention allocation through two channels. First, as discussed above, for given pro…t-maximizing price responsiveness to shocks, more attention is paid to more volatile shocks. Second, shock volatilities in ‡uence the attention allocation problem through relative pro…t-maximizing responsiveness, !: since more volatile shocks receive relatively more attention by all …rms, they also have a higher associated price level responsiveness; the feedback e¤ect from price level responsiveness to the pro…t-maximizing price responsiveness a¤ects the attention allocation decision. Whether this feedback reinforces or reduces the impact of di¤erences in volatilities of shocks on the attention allocation decision depends on the degree of complementarity in attention allocation, : It is at this stage that parameters of the interest rate feedback rule a¤ect the attention allocation decision.
In the case of positive complementarity in attention allocation, < 1; if intermediate good producer i's competitors are more responsive to a type of shock, then it is more worthwhile for intermediate good producer i to pay attention to that shock. In this case, the feedback e¤ect reinforces the impact of di¤erent volatilities on attention allocation; in contrast, in the case > 1; if intermediate good producer i's competitors are more responsive to a type shock, then it is less worthwhile for intermediate good producer i to pay attention to that shock. In this case, the feedback e¤ect reduces the impact of di¤erent volatilities.
Discussion of results
This section provides a more informal discussion of results about the interaction of real rigidities, monetary policy and complementarity in attention allocation. Economic intuition can be gained from the pro…t-maximizing price equation (11) , where log(p it ) depends on the price level, P t ; and on the the output-gap, Ct e " a;t : It follows from (11) that the partial elasticity of the pro…t-maximizing price with respect to the price level is equal to one, while it is equal to with respect to the output-gap: Therefore, for given price level and output-gap dynamics, the smaller ; the relatively larger the weight of the price level in pro…t-maximizing price dynamics: Higher real rigidities imply relatively higher feedback from the price level to pro…t-maximizing prices. Therefore, through the price level, the allocation of attention decision by other …rms becomes relatively more important for the individual …rm decision.
In order to understand how monetary policy interacts with complementarities, we need to understand the way monetary policy interacts with output-gap dynamics. In the policy rule (4) ; an increase in both and c reduces the ‡uctuations in outputgap to all shocks. For given price level responsiveness, the smaller responsiveness of the output-gap to shocks induces the price level to be relatively more important for pro…t-maximizing price dynamics. Of course, in equilibrium, the increase in and c also a¤ects price level responsiveness, but it does so through averaging over prices set by …rms, which depends on the feedback from the price level to the pro…t-maximizing price. Therefore, a monetary policy that lean against the wind increases the feedback e¤ect from the price level to the pro…t-maximizing price, increasing complementarity in attention allocation and, therefore, amplifying the di¤erence in price responsiveness.
The dynamic extension
The simple general equilibrium model analyzed sofar has provided valuable economic insights on the role of monetary policy, and other structural parameters, in determining price responsiveness to technology and monetary policy shocks. This section extends such a model to a more dynamic framework in order to study price and in ‡ation impulse responses to persistent innovations.
In particular, let's assume that innovations to labor productivity in (8) depend on the following exogenous processes,
where a;t is normal and iid, a;t v N (0; 2 a ) : Let's also assume that there is inertia in nominal interest rates so that the dynamics of R t are given by
The rest of the economy is unchanged from previous sections. While this basic model lacks many features of standard business cycle models, such as physical capital accumulation, it is able to generate quite rich dynamics of price and in ‡ation impulse responses to the two types of shocks. 12 
Model calibration
It is not possible to solve the model analytically so I use numerical methods. 13 I drew on the business cycle literature for the values of the preference parameter, , of output elasticity to labor, ; and discount factor, : In particular, similarly to Golosov and
Lucas [12] , the demand elasticity parameter is set equal to 7, while the parameter is set equal to 0.64, to match the average labor share of output in the U.S. This implies a degree of real rigidity = 0:32: 14 The discount factor is set to = 0:993; so to have an annual nominal interest rate in steady state equal to 3 percent.
Monetary policy parameters, and c ; are set equal to estimates of (32) on the U.S. data from 1979 to 2007, corresponding to the terms of Volcker and Greenspan at the helm of the Federal Reserve. 15 Given these estimates, I set = 2; c = 0:21 and r = 0:71: The volatility of the monetary policy shock is set equal to the standard deviation of the residual in the estimation of (32) ; implying r = 0:0018:
The parameters of the exogenous productivity process are obtained from …tting an AR(1) process to the detrended logarithm of U.S. total factor productivity estimated by Fernald [11] from 1979 to 2007. 16 Therefore, I set a = 0:7 and a to match the estimated standard deviation of innovations in the AR(1) process for total factor productivity, equal to 0:006: 17 Finally, similarly to Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] , I 12 In a previuos version of this paper (available on the author's web site) I have solved a model with capital accumulation, investment adjustment costs and habit formation. While the computational burden increases, results of this paper are robust to these di¤erent assumptions. 13 See Appendix E for detalis. 14 Notice that this is a conservative calibration of : In the new-Keynesian literature the parameter is often set at lower values. For instance, Woodford [27] suggest values of between 0.1 and 0.15. 15 Estimates have been obtained applying GMM techniques, as suggested by Clarida, Gali and Gerlter [8] . I refer to these authors for more details on the estimation technique. Data on expected in ‡ation has been obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters available on-line at the Philadelphia FED. 16 Fernald [11] estimates TFP in the U.S. with a Solow residual approach, adjusting for labor hoarding and capital utilization. 17 Figure 2 plots US TFP growth rate and changes in the Federal Funds rate. set = 3: This is a conservative calibration for ; as in equilibrium …rms face a very small loss from not being perfectly informed about technology and monetary policy shocks. Such a loss is in the order of 0.1 percent of steady state revenues.
Impulse responses
In the …rst column of Figure 4 , I plot the impulse responses of in ‡ation and price level to technology and monetary policy shocks: The model correctly predicts in ‡ation and the price level to be substantially more responsive to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. In fact, …rms allocate 78 percent of information processing capabilities, ; to technology shocks and only 22 percent to monetary policy shocks.
As a consequence, they are on average more informed about realizations of aggregate technology shocks, justifying the asymmetry in in ‡ation and prices behavior in response to the two shocks seen in the data.
As benchmark of comparison, in the second column of Figure 4 , I plot impulse responses of in ‡ation and the price level under the assumption that the friction in price setting is not imperfect information but rather nominal rigidities. In particular, I consider a standard Calvo-type model of price setting under perfect information, where …rms have an exogenous probability of not changing their prices in any given period. In this model, the dynamics of in ‡ation in log-deviation from the nonstochastic steady state are given by in both models of price setting, the underlying framework is such that the mapping from the two types of shocks to the pro…t-maximizing price is the same. However, di¤erently from the rational inattention model, in the Calvo model the friction in price setting is also identical across the two shocks. The latter is roughly responsible for the di¤erent predictions of the Calvo model.
However, these results do not mean that Calvo models of price setting always imply in ‡ation to respond the same way to technology and monetary policy shocks.
In fact, it is possible to build a model where in ‡ation responds di¤erently to the two shocks, by allowing for a di¤erent mapping from shocks to pro…t-maximizing prices.
However, other authors have shown that matching in ‡ation responses to technology and monetary policy shocks in these models is, at least, challenging.
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The advantage of the model presented in this paper is that it does not need to rely on speci…c assumptions about the way technology and monetary policy shocks transmits to pro…t-maximizing prices in order to explain the di¤erent behavior of in ‡ation, but only relies on endogenous attention allocation decisions by …rms.
Interest rate feedback rule and endogenous attention allocation
The numerical implementation in the previous section has shown that the model of 
Discussion on impact of monetary policy on economic ‡uctuations
Several authors have recently studied optimal monetary policy in models of imperfect information. 21 While studying optimal policy is beyond the scope of this paper, the paper yields novel predictions on the impact of a change in the coe¢ cients of the 20 One could also allow for to respond to the change in in monetary policy. While this is realistic, it has been studied by Branch et al. [7] in a framework with endogenous inattention, and I refer to these authors for a discussion. This paper looks at another margin, working through 21 For instance, Adam [1] has studied optimal monetary policy under imperfect information, but wihtout attention allocation decision. Lorenzoni [15] , Angelitos and La'O [3] and Angelitos and Pavan [4] have recently studied optimal monetary policy in frameworks with imperfect information, where the monetary policy instruments may a¤ect information dipsersion.
Taylor rule on the economy when compared to more standard models of sticky prices.
In particular, this paper has shown that monetary policy a¤ects the economy trough a novel channel related to the attention allocation decision.
When monetary authority changes the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule on expected in ‡ation and output, it a¤ects the economy trough two channels. The …rst channel is a standard one, taking place also in models of nominal rigidities: for given information structure, a nominal interest rate responding more (less) to expected in ‡ation and output ‡uctuations accommodates technology shocks and o¤sets monetary policy shocks more (less); this reduces (increases) output-gap ‡uctuations, causing a smaller (larger) variability of prices to both types of shocks. The second channel is novel: by a¤ecting the degree of complementarity in attention allocation, a more (less) active policy induces …rms to pay more (less) attention to the most volatile shocks and less (more) to the least volatile ones. Tables 1 and 2 report standard deviations of in ‡ation and output-gap respectively, computed conditional on technology and monetary policy shocks, under both active and inactive policies. 22 The active policy is the benchmark calibration: = 2; c = 0:25: The inactive policy is ! 1;
Each statistic is scaled by the standard deviation of the corresponding shock. Equivalently, these statistics refer to shocks with unit standard deviations. This asymmetry is due to the fact that monetary policy activism causes higher fraction of attention allocated to technology shocks, making …rms more informed on these shocks. This worsens monetary authority power to stabilize the economy conditional on these shocks, so that, despite the more aggressive policy, in ‡ation and outputgap variabilities are not reduced. In contrast, monetary policy activism causes lower fraction of attention allocated to monetary policy shocks. This improves monetary authority power to stabilize the economy conditional on these shocks, so that the more aggressive policy has a larger impact on in ‡ation and output-gap variabilities to monetary policy shocks.
These results contrast with the predictions from the Calvo model: there monetary policy activism has similar e¤ects on output-gap and in ‡ation variability conditional on technology and monetary policy shocks, as the frequency of price setting is exogenous to the model. 23 Exploring further the consequences for optimal monetary policy of the link between monetary policy and information acquisition decisions by …rms is in the author's view an important avenue for future research.
Finally, one could also allow for to respond endogenously to the changes in the monetary policy rule. The endogeneity of information acquisition rate has already been studied by Branch et al. [7] in a slightly di¤erent framework with endogenous inattention. This paper focuses instead on the attention allocation margin, as this is the margin that allows to explain the di¤erent behavior of prices in response to tech- 
Robustness analysis
This section investigates to what extent results from the model of section 2 are robust to di¤erent set of assumptions about information channels. The insights from these exercises reinforce the results obtained in the previous sections.
Removing the independency assumption on information processing
So far this paper has assumed that attending to technology and monetary policy shocks are separate activities. Hellwig and Venkateswaran [13] show that, by allowing for a signal process that contains information on two types of shocks, it is possible that …rms respond relatively fast to a given type of shock, despite this shock is relatively not very volatile. Therefore, let's consider the case in which signals provide information of both types of shocks, similarly to Hellwig and Venkateswaran [13] , but where the volatility of the noise in these signals is endogenous. In particular, let's consider a signal structure suggested by Mackowiak and Wiederholt [18] , s ai;t =p at + p rt + u ai;t ; u ai;t s N (0;
s ri;t =p rt + p at + u ri;t ; u ri;t s N (0;
wherep ait andp rit are linear combinations of " at and " rt ; representing the pro…t-maximizing responses to technology and monetary policy shocks, so that from (27) I have thatp at =p at +p rt : 24 The coe¢ cient is a constant, indexing the information content of each signal about the two types of shocks: if 0 < < 1; signal s ai;t is relatively more informative about pro…t-maximizing responses to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks.
The …rm will now choose ai and ri to maximize (14) subject to (15) (16) ; given the signal structure in (34) (35). If technology shocks are relatively more volatile than monetary policy shocks, the optimal attention allocation is such that …rms pay relatively more attention to the signal providing relatively more information on technology shocks. As ! 0 or ! 1 the solution converges to the solution presented in Section 2. Only if the decision-maker can attend directly to a su¢ cient statistic concerning the pro…t-maximizing price ( = 1) the price responds to monetary policy shocks in the same way as to aggregate shocks.
How much has to be di¤erent from 1 in order for prices to respond su¢ ciently stronger to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks depends, among other things, on the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting, on monetary policy and on volatility of the two shocks. Figure 6 plots relative price responsiveness, ; as
a function of and ; under a calibration for which technology shocks are relatively more volatile, > 1: Allowing for signals providing information on both types of shocks reduces di¤erences in price responsiveness relative to the case of independent signals, for given parameterization of the model, but it is still the case that prices will respond relatively more to more volatile shocks, as the volatility in the signal noise is chosen optimally.
If signals provide information on both types of shocks, the impact of shock volatility di¤erentials on price responsiveness di¤erentials is weakened. This makes more crucial understanding the role played by strategic complementarity in price setting and monetary policy in magnifying the impact of volatilities di¤erentials onto allocation of attention.
Allowing for signals on endogenous aggregate variables
An alternative assumption on the information structure of the private sector is to have …rms processing information on the realizations of endogenous aggregate variables.
Speci…cally, let's assume that each price setter can receive the following signals,
where u j i;t is assumed to be iid across both time and individuals: 25 This signal structure conveys the idea that each …rm processes information about realizations of variables that are usually available in the real world. Given that the price setter is interested in extracting information about the realization of the pro…t-maximizing price, 25 I assume that these statistics contains no public noise. Information is therefore published and available with no error. The noise in the signals has to be interpreted exclusively as …rm speci…c errors in processing the information. p i;t ; he will pay attention to the di¤erent signals accordingly. Di¤erently from the signal-extraction literature, and in the spirit of the rational inattention literature, the price setter chooses the precision of the signals, ( c ; p ; r ; l ) ; to maximize the quadratic objective in (13) ; subject to the following constraint on the average amount of information processed per period, I (f" a;t ; " r;t g ; fs i;t g) :
By choosing how precisely to acquire information about the di¤erent signals in (36), The pro…t function of …rm i at time t is given by i;t = (p i;t ; W t ; " a;t ; C t ; P t ) = P t C t
Pro…ts can be expressed in terms of log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state:
i;t = p i;t ;Ŵ t ; " a;t ;Ĉ t ;P t C eP
Firm i chooses the attention allocation so as to maximize the expected discounted sum of pro…ts expressed in of log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state,
Similar to Maćkowiak and Wiederholt [18] , the value of the quadratic objective at the pro…t-maximizing behavior p i;t+ Given that in the non-stochastic steady state p i = p i ; it follows that
A.2 De…nition of information ‡ow operator
Following the rational inattention literature, the operator I is de…ned such that
From the properties of entropies and given the assumptions f" a;t g ? f" r;t g, fs a;t g ? fs r;t g ; f" a;t g ? fs r;t g and fs a;t g ? f" r;t g ; it follows that I (f" a;t ; " r;t g ; fs ai;t ; s ri;t g) = I (f" a;t g ; fs ai;t g) + I (f" r;t g ; fs ri;t g) :
For a proof see Cover and Thomas [9] .
B.1 First order conditions
De…ne t as the Lagrangian multiplier on (2) : The …rst order conditions to the household's problem are given by
where (42) holds in each state of the world in t+1, and (2) holds in each period.
For given P t and W t ; this set of equations determines the equilibrium dynamics of C t ; Q t;t+1 ; L t ; t : The equilibrium condition into the labor market,
The equilibrium condition for the risk-free portfolio,
determines the equilibrium dynamics of P t : Eq. (6) determines c i;t : Eq. (11) determines p i;t :
The equations determining the equilibrium p i;t ; s ai;t and s ri;t depends on the solution to the problem in (14) (16) ; and are derived below.
B.2 Proof of existence of non-stochastic steady state
Given the absence of uncertainty and homogeneity of …rms it follows from (7)
that p i = p i = P : Given stationarity, it follows from (42) and (44) that R = 1 : By 
and where ! ( ) is a linear function of a and r , i) : s ai;t = " a;t + u ai;t ; u ai;t s N (0; 2 ai ) ; ii) : s ri;t = " r;t + u ri;t ; u ri;t s N (0; 2 ri ) ; iii) :p ai;t = E p ai;t j s ai;t ; iv) :p ri;t = E p ri;t j s ri;t ; v) : I (f" a;t ; " r;t g ; fs ai;t ; s ri;t g) :
where u ai;t and u ri;t are idiosyncratic noise, iid across …rms and time. From appendix A, and given the joint Gaussian distribution of " a;t and s ai;t ; and of " r;t and s ri;t ; it follows that I (f" a;t ; " r;t g ; fs ai;t ; s ri;t g) = I (f" a;t g ; fs ai;t g) + I (f" r;t g ; fs ri;t g) 
The the …rst-order conditions to (49) (50) imply 
where ! and are de…ned as .
(Step 5): Solving for aggregate demand
It is left to show that, given (21) (26) ; (20) is also an equilibrium. From the Intertemporal Euler condition to the household's problem it follows that
From (4) it follows that R t = E tPt+1 P t + c E tĈt+1 E tĈ t+1 + c Ĉ t Ĉ t + " r;t :
From de…nition ofĈ t it follows thatĈ t = " a;t : From (19) (20) ; and de…nition of a static equilibrium, it follows that E tĈt+1 = 0 and E tPt+1 = 0: By substituting (53) and the results above into (52) ; and solving forĈ t ; equation (20) is obtained:
D Proof of Proposition 4
At an interior solution, and for …nite , the function ( ) is strictly decreasing:
Therefore, ( ) is decreasing in : From the de…nition of in (??) ; it immediately follows that is increasing in :
The derivative of with respect to the degree of strategic complementarity in attention allocation is given by
where 
:
Therefore, it follows from above that 
E Solving the dynamic extension
The model is solved in two steps. In the …rst step, we approximate the dyamics of in ‡ation in response to technology and monetary policy shocks in deviations from the non-stochastic steady-state as a function of two ARMA(2,2) processes, t =^ a;t +^ r;t ; a;t = a;1^ a;t 1 + a;2^ a;t 2 + # a;0 a;t + # a;1 a;t 1 ; r;t = r;1^ r;t 1 + r;2^ r;t 2 + # r;0 r;t + # r;1 r;t 1 :
We give a guess for the parameters of the two ARMA processes and solve the general equilibrium model with standard methods of undetermined coe¢ cients, where we replace the equation de…ning in ‡ation dynamics from …rms'price setting behavior with the guess above.
In the second step, we solve for the attention allocation problem given dynamics ofp t implied by step 1. The solution to the attention allocation problem gives the dynamics of^ a;t and^ r;t : We approximate these dynamics with ARMA(2,2) processes as above, update the guess and start from step 1 until convergence. Notice that results are robust to ARMA(p,q) processes for q and p > 2:
